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A B S T R A C T  
 
Since multiple failure events associated with derailments could not be identified and derailment probability could not be 
reached quantitatively by event tree and fault tree analysis for safety assessment in railway systems, applications of Bayesian 
network (BN) were introduced over the last few years. The applications were often aimed at understanding safety and 
reliability of railway systems through various basic principles and unique inference algorithms focusing on particular railway 
infrastructures. One of the most critical engineering infra-structure, railway turnouts (RTs) have been investigated and 
analysed critically in order to develop a new BN-based model with unique algorithm. This unprecedented study reveals the 
causal relations between primary causes and the subsystem failures, resulting in derailment, as a result of extreme weather-
related conditions. In addition, the model, which is designed for rare events, has been proposed to identify the probability and 
un-derlying root cause of derailment. Consequently, it is expected that various weather-related causes of derailment at RTs, 
one such undesirable event, which can result, albeit rarely, damaging rolling stock, railway infrastructure and disrupting 
service, and having the potential to cause casualties and even loss of life, are identified to allow for smooth railway operation 
by rail industry itself. The insight into this weather-derailment will help the in-dustry to better manage railway operation 
under climate uncertainty.  
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Railway transportation seems to be in an upward trend in demand, being 
not only particularly sustainable, but also considerably cheaper than air 
operations and faster than shipping. According to the Association of 
American Railroads (Hamberger, 2015), although the USA has long been 
known to have the world’s longest railway network, its rail network is still 
being increased and is twice what it was in 80s. Whether developed or not, 
similar trends for the other countries have often been seen (Kaewunruen et al., 
2016). Such an increase gives rise to operational concerns due to a revealing 
lack of existing management strategies as well as partly understanding of 
causal relations in various critical railway systems. 
 
A railway turnout system, as one of the most critical systems in railway 
infrastructure, is manufactured and then installed to enable a rolling stock to 
divert from one direction to another. A railway has very complex geometry 
and demands an error-free railway operation since a large number of turnout 
components interrelate with each other. As a result, turnout railway systems 
are seen to be a significant railway  
 
 
 
 
engineering system quite vulnerable to accidents, e.g. collision, de-railment 
(Dindar and Kaewunruen, 2018). It is found that derailment accounts for 9% 
of all accidents types, and the majority of those de-railments occur on 
turnouts (Dindar et al., 2016a). A derailment is likely to take place on railway 
turnouts when a rolling stock, such as a train, experiences unauthorised 
movements, causing it to run oﬀ  turn-outs for a variety known reasons. The 
eﬀ ects the extreme weather conditions, one of these reasons, have on 
derailment at railway turnout systems are identified to pose serious concern 
that need to be consider in risk management (Dindar et al., 2017; Sa’adin et 
al., 2017).  
The impact of weather conditions on railway turnout systems in the 
literature is a new and quite diverse topic followed by quite limited number of 
scholars within two categories: Conditional-Based Maintenance (CBM), 
which only suggests a prognostic attitude towards maintenance (Kaewunruen 
and Remennikov, 2005; Vale and Ribeiro, 2014), and Risk-Based 
Maintenance (RBM), which suggests an alter-native or complementary 
strategy to minimise the risk resulting from any kind of failures and accidents 
or errors in breakdown of manage-ment (Ishak et al., 2016; Sa’adin et al., 
2016). The advances in the 
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former starts with a simple state-based prognostic method simply aiming at 
predicting railway turnout failures (Eker et al., 2011). This study is followed 
by a precipitate statistical investigation showing that a significant number of 
turnout component failures might be caused by weather conditions 
(Hassankiadeh, 2011). Also, it is found that sea-sonal changes have a 
considerable impact on prognostics involving railway turnouts. Mahboob et 
al. (2012) summarised a number of Component Importance Measures (CIM), 
deriving the computation of the CIM using Bayesian Networks (BNs) and 
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA). It has recently been presented that the eﬀ ect of 
weather on railway turnouts can be evaluated through a failure prediction 
model based on Bayesian Networks (Guang et al., 2017). However, all these 
attempts require the railway industry to understand the link between only 
components failures with weather conditions on railway turnouts. 
 
As regards Risk-Based studies, it can be stressed that this seems to present 
a huge gap in the related literature, as these studies often aim to fill the gap 
associated with derailment events. A probabilistic model was developed to 
forecast rail breaks and controlling risk of derailment (Zhao et al., 2007). Risk 
categorisation and prioritisation are achieved for geometry restoration of 
railway turnout systems in various opera-tional environments (Ishak et al., 
2016). Dindar et al. showed how a turnout can be aﬀ ected by the diversity of 
risks arising from natural hazards and global warming (Dindar et al., 2016b). 
This study has been the first investigation to reveal a significant relationship 
between de-railment and weather/climate conditions. Turnout component 
failures by several weather patterns are investigated (Wanga et al., 2017). 
This research is limited to component failures considering only precipitation 
on a particular location and particular rail lines regardless of con-sequences of 
such failures, e.g. Derailment. Finally, Dindar and Kaewunruen (2016) 
developed a risk-based maintenance strategy for geometry problems of 
turnouts, considering various failures in order to minimise the risk of 
derailment on them. 
 
In this paper, a risk analysis based on railway turnout systems under 
uncertainty of all weather and environmental conditions is proposed for  
a systemic decision support to dealing with derailment. Buckley’s confidence 
interval-based method is used to reach the proposed ap-proach, which is 
capable of modelling both statistical uncertainty or randomness and linguistic 
vagueness. The confidence intervals are nested into Fuzzy Bayesian Networks 
(FBN) to investigate causal re-lationships between weather patterns and 
derailments on the systems. Sensitivity analysis is implemented into a detailed 
fuzzy-based in-ference procedure to reduce limitation by scarce data 
environment and to ensure solid estimate. 
 
To reach more appropriate, realistic and reliable results than con-
ventional and fuzzy methods, which are based only on one source of 
knowledge, this paper uses data information of 50 states, having dif-ferent 
climate patterns, through real accident reports over the last ten years. The 
structure of this paper is as follows: in Section 2, a brief introduction of 
Bayesian networks is given. Then, in Section 3, fuzzy probability using 
Buckley’s approach is explained in detail. In Section 4, possible weather 
patterns inducing derailment risk on railway turnout systems are discussed. 
Then, the proposed model and its learning al-gorithm are discussed and 
shown. In Section 6, the model is applied on a railway turnout and its results 
are presented. Finally, Section 7 con-cludes this paper. 
 
 
2. Bayesian Networks 
 
BNs, also known as belief networks, Bayes network or Bayes nets, belong 
to the family of probabilistic graphical models (PGM), which enable 
representation and reasoning about an uncertain domain. The nodes in PGM, 
specifically referred to in BNs as directed acyclic graph (DAG), represent a 
set of random variables, V = X1,…Xi,…,Xn, from the domain, while the 
edges between the nodes represent their probabilistic dependencies among the 
corresponding random variables. Statistical and computational methods allow 
for estimation of these conditional 
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dependencies in the graph. Thus, BNs utilise from various principles, 
including graph theory, probability theory, computer science and sta-tistics. 
 
BNs are a set of all parameters in the network. A conditional probability 
as a parameter in the network is defined through  
Θ Xi |πi = PBN (Xi |πi) for each xi state of Xi, given the parent set πi. With a 
conditional probability and a DAG, a BN defines a joint probability distribution 
(JPD), also known as “chain rule”, for V, which is acquired by the following 
equation, Eq. (1) (Nielsen and Jensen, 2009): 
 
n 
P(V ) = P(X1 ,… ,Xn ) = ∏ P (Xi |πi)  
i=1 (1)  
Any node in BNs is likely not to be any parent in the chain. Thus, the node 
has only marginal distribution, P (Xi), as being independent of the other 
variables. Additionally, each node in a BN is associated with a conditional 
probability, P (Xi |πi), of any variable Xi whose parent set, πi, is present. This 
conditional probability is calculated by following equation, Eq. (2) (Nielsen 
and Jensen, 2009).  
P(Xi |πi) = 
P(X
i 
∩
 
π
i
) 
(2) P (πi)  
Considering the BN in Fig. 1, the full joint probability distribution of this BN 
might be simplified as  
P (A,B ,C ,D ,E ) = P (A ) P (B ) P (C ) P (D |A,B ) P (E |C ,D) (3) 
 
Conditional and marginal probability distributions of these variables are 
presented in Tables 1–5. A, B and C are classified only in Marginal 
Probability Tables as they do not have a parent node. On the other hand, 
conditional probability distributions of D and E are generated in Table 3 and 
4.  
The joint probability of this BN is calculated with the following Eq.:  
P (a i bj c k dl en ) P (A = a i ,B = bj ,C = c k ,D = dl ,E = en)  
=
 
p
ai 
p
 bj 
p
ck 
pa p b pd   p p dl 
p  
i j  l   ck  
e
n  
p p 
bj 
  p p 
dl  (4)  ai     ck  
This determination of marginal and conditional probability tables en-ables 
probabilities for these variables, e.g. P (A|B ),P (A|D), to be calcu-lated. 
 
 
3. Fuzzy probability 
 
3.1. Preliminaries 
 
This section sets up the terminology and notation that is not part of the 
technical contribution, but is needed to delineate material of the 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. A BN for variables A, B, C, D, E. 
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Table 1  
Marginal probability table for A.  
 P (A = a1) P (A = a2) 
     
 pa1 pa2 
     
 Table 2   
 Marginal probability table for B.    
    
 
 P (B = b1) P (B = b2) 
     
 pb1 pb2 
     
 Table 3   
 Marginal probability table for C.    
   
 
 P (C = c1) P (C = c2) 
    
 pc1 pc2 
      
 
Table 4  
Conditional probability table for D. 
 
A B P ((D = d1)|A,B ) P ((D = d2 )|A,B) 
            
a1 b1 
p
a1,b1,d1 
p
b1,b1,d2 
  
p
a1,b1     
p
b1,b1     
a2 
b
1 
p
a2,b1,d1 
p
a2,b1,d2 
  
p
a2,b1    
p
a2,b1    
a1 
b
2 
p
a1,b 2,d1 
p
a1,b 2,d2 
  
p
a1,b2   
p
a1,b2   
a2 b2 
p
a2,b 2,d1 
p
a2,b 2,d2 
  
p
a2,b2  
p
a2,b2   
 
Table 5  
Conditional probability table for E.  
C D P ((E = e 1)|C ,D) P ((E = e 2 )|C ,D) 
           
c1 d1 
p
c1,d1,e1 
p
c1,d1,e2 
  
p
c1,d1    
p
c1,d1     
c2 
d
1 
p
c 2,d1,e1 
p
c 2,d1,e2 
  
p
c 2,d1   
p
c 2,d1   c
1 
d
2 
p
c1,d2,e1 
p
c1,d2,e2 
  
p
c1,d2   
p
c1,d2   
c2 d2 
p
c 2,d2,e1 
p
c 2,d2,e2 
  
p
c 2,d2  
p
c 2,d2   
 
paper.  
Definition 1. the membership function of an element, x, is μ∼A (x ). The 
∼ 
element belongs to a fuzzy set A , where each element of x is always mapped 
to a value between 0 and 1, i.e. 0 μ ∼A (x ) 1 (Dubois and Prade, 1980).  
∼ 
Definition 2. A fuzzy number A is a fuzzy set on . μ∼A (x ) is its membership 
function (Dubois and Prade, 1980) such that  
   ∼    
i. The α-cut of a fuzzy set A is closed intervals of   and denoted as the 
 crisp set A∝ given by A ∝ = { x ∈ X : μ ∼ (x )   ∝} where 0   ∝ < 1. 
  ∼  A   
ii. A fuzzy set A is said to be convex due to   
μ∼ (λx + (1−λ ) x )   min(μ ∼ (x ),μ ∼ (x )) for λ ∈ [0,1]   
A 1 2 A 1 A   
2 
  
     ∼ ∼ 
= a1,a2 ,a3 Definition 3. α−cutFN is a fuzzy number A by the triplet A 
with the shape of concave function if its membership function μ∼A (x ) is 
given by Buckley (2004): 
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 0 for x < a1 
x
 
−
 
a
1  
< x < a2  a2 − a1 for a1 μ
∼A 
(x
 
)
 
=
  a3 − x  
< x < a3  a3 − a2 for a2 
 
0 for a3 < x    
Definition 4. 
    ∼ 
(α ) = [a1,b1] The mathematical operations of two TFNs, X 
 ∼       
and Y (α ) = [a2 ,b 2] are as follows(Dubois and Prade, 1980; Buckley, 
2004):       
o 
∼ ∼ 
(α ) = [a1,b1] + [a2 ,b 2 ] = [a1 + a2 ,b1 + b2] 
 
X (α ) + Y  
o  
∼ 
      
∼        
X (α )· Y (α ) = [a1,b1]·[a2 ,b 2 ] = [min(a1 · a2 ,a1 · b 2 ,b1 · a2 ,b1 · b 2 ),max(a1 · a2 ,a1· 
o 
∼    ∼ b 2 ,b1 · a2 ,b1 · b 2)]  
X (α )−Y (α ) = [a1,b1]−[a2 ,b 2 ] = [a1−b 2 ,b1−a2]  
 ∼ ∼ 1  1  
o X (α )/ Y (α ) = [a1,b1]/[a2 ,b 2 ] = [a1,b1]·[ 
 
 
 
] 
 
b
 2 
a
2  
 
3.2. Probability of fuzzy events 
 
A random variable x is in a sample space X. Then, a crisp event is defined 
as a subset of A, and its unconditional probability Pr (A) is calculated by the 
following Eq.:  
Pr (A ) = ∫ f (x ) dx = ∫+∞ XA (x ) f (x ) dx 
(5) x ∈ A −∞ 
where XA (x ) is membership of an element in a subset A of X, a binary 
indicator function with the value 0 for all elements of X not in A and the 
value 1 for all elements of A.  
On the other hand, it has been expressed in previous section that the 
indicator functions XA (x ) of fuzzy events are their membership func-tions, 
μ∼A (x ). Thus, XA (x ) in the Eq. can be replaced with 
μ ∼A (x ): X → [0,1], as such:  
Pr (A ) = ∫+∞ μ ∼A (x ) f (x ) dx 
(6) −∞  
Eq. (6), that is, estimates a fuzzy probability density function through the 
product μ∼A (x ) f (x) 
 
3.3. Fuzzy estimation based on Buckley’s method 
 
The method is quite new application to the BN in risk calculation of 
engineering systems, but it is proposed that Buckley’s approach might be one 
of the best solution to rare events within a scarce data en-vironment (Ersel 
and İçen, 2016). To calculate probability on the basis of fuzzy knowledge, 
Buckley proposes two approaches defining the probability as a triangular-
shaped fuzzy number. The diﬀ erences be-tween the two relates to the source 
of knowledge from which the sta-tistical model for probability estimate is 
utilised. In the first approach, a1, a2 and a3 values are defined in accordance 
with expert opinion, while the other deals with data, considering suitable 
confidence inter-vals to uncertainness in the clusters. 
 
This approach has long been used by various scholars interested in only 
two possible outcomes, labelled success and failure. Let p be the probability 
of a success and x be the number of times we had a success in n independent 
repetitions of this experiment. Therefore, if we want to estimate the value of 
probability p based on this approach, then a random sample, which, here, is 
running the experiment ‘n’ independent times, i.e. X1, X2, …, Xn, should be 
gathered. The probability density function of this experiment is defined as f (x 
,p).  
Based on this experiment, p, as a single unknown parameter, is calculated 
with interval cuts. We make 100(1−∝ )%,0 ∝ 1, confidence intervals for p. 
These confidence intervals are donated [p1 (∝ ),p2 (∝ )]. Moreover, these 
confidence intervals are nested. The confidence inter-vals are then placed on 
top of one another in the way of ∝ =0 to ∝ =1 
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in order to create a fuzzy number p, whose ∝ - cuts are the confidence 
intervals. The mathematical progress of a fuzzy number is explained as 
follows:  
It is known that p −̂p = p−( 
1
 
−
n 
p
 ) , where p ,̂equals to x/n, donates the 
point of estimation and also n donates the number of independent repetitions, 
roughly N (0,1) if n is suﬃciently large. Thus, 
 
P (p −̂z β /2  p (1−̂p )/ n ̂p p ̂+ z β /2  p (p ̂(1−p̂)/ n ) ) ≈̂(1−β)  
 
The equation above leads to the (1-β)100% approximate confidence interval 
for p  
[p −̂z β /2  p (1−p )/ n, p ̂ p + ̂zβ /2  p (1−p )/ n ] (7)  
Therefore, (1−β)100% confidence intervals for each β might be found. This 
gives p, and β is suggested to be between 0.01 and 1. In accordance with this 
range, these intervals can be presented as [p 
L
 (β ),p
U
 (β )]. 
 
To produce a triangular-shaped fuzzy number p whose ∝ – cuts are the 
confidence intervals, we can place these confidence intervals in the way of one 
over another with the following equation for 0.01 β 1.  
∼ 
(∝ ) = [p 
L
 (∝ ),p
U
 (∝ )] (8) P 
 
This allows for gathering more information in p than just a single confidence 
interval or just a point estimate. Thus, p , which is a trian-gular-shaped fuzzy 
number, will be the fuzzy estimator for p. 
 
 
4. Weather-related derailments 
 
Weather-related derailments continue to account for a significant 
proportion of general railway accidents. Unlike other kind of derail-ment 
causes, weather-related derailments are not often given due consideration 
because, firstly, the occurrence of such derailments is not considerably high 
and, secondly, there still presents a gap in the lit-erature to understand 
precisely the fundamental impacts of weather patterns on turnout-related 
derailments. Therefore, risk management strategies for railway turnout 
systems in particular might be said to lag behind what the industry currently 
requires, which leads to a decrease in the asset reliability and eﬃciency, and, 
as a result, loss of lives as well as financial burden through the asset failures 
 
 
4.1. Accident codes 
 
In this study, weather-related derailments are defined as accidents the 
causes of which primarily refer to any adverse weather patterns or undesirable 
environment-related condition on the turnout. In other words, extreme 
environmental conditions, i.e. extremely strong wind might be a reason for 
derailments. Those happenings cannot be pre-vented, but can generally be 
predicted based on events in the past. The other causes, e.g. icing track, are 
assumed to be turnout-related failures, but their primary reasons are weather 
conditions. This could be re-medied through various engineering methods. 
Whether it is predictable or remediable, both groups are handled in this study. 
Accident de-scriptions in the oﬃcial reports of the U.S. Federal Railroad 
Administration have been investigated through such a consideration. 
 
Table 6 illustrates a group of codes and its primary causes, ex-plaining 
why a derailment occurs. The codes are limited as to whether the 
environmental relation can be matched with derailment cases. As a result, it 
has been identified that some track alignment irregularities need attention. As 
seen, some codes, e.g. M101, entail a cluster of primary causes, which are 
diﬀ erent from one another. Thus, it is not possible to use the raw codes as 
nodes to establish a Bayes Network, as the nodes should be probabilistically 
related by some sort of causal dependency. It is also worth noting that, 
although M199 is used to determine the accidents with any cause out of M101 
to M105, low temperature or water flow are seen as primary causes. 
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Table 6  
FRA codes most used in the study.  
 
Code Situation Primary cause 
   
M101 Changes in condition of a turnout Snow, ice and mud on track 
M102 Extreme environmental condition Tornado, high wind 
M103 Extreme environmental condition Flood 
M104 Extreme environmental condition Dense fog 
M105 Extreme environmental condition Extreme wind velocity 
M199 Other extreme environmental Rarely seen, such as low 
 conditions temperature, water flow 
T109 Track alignment irregularity Buckling 
   
 
4.2. Causes and risk factors 
 
Although the codes allow for capturing every detail associated with the 
causes and resulting consequences of each accident, it is necessary to find 
what fundamentally gives rise to derailment. Additionally, it is vital to 
categorise similar reasons to manage and mitigate well. Considering the 
primary causes in Table 6, various risk factors driving derailment on railway 
turnout systems can be stressed as following. 
 
4.2.1. Floods, rains and saturated soil  
High waters from persistent heavy rains, flash floods, have been identified 
to be one of the conspicuous weather-related concerns of the railway industry. 
Washouts, the consequence of a natural disaster where the track-bed is eroded 
away by flowing water, have the po-tential to weaken chair and ballast, which 
might be determined as a serious geometry problem. Although they are 
mostly seen to occur on plain track, turnouts might be exposed to them in 
sidings and yards, particularly in the countryside. It was shown that turnouts 
are quite vulnerable mechanical installations to geometry problems, and those 
with such problems are highly likely to give rise to derailment accidents 
(Ishak et al., 2016). Aside from runoﬀ  and washout, snowmelt too might 
result in similar saturation problems on railway turnout bed. 
 
 
4.2.2. High wind and tornadoes  
High winds are frequently seen as a cause of derailment on main lines, 
blowing rolling stock oﬀ  tracks. The winds might be more ef-fective in 
moving rolling stock on railway turnouts as the running safety regarding 
crosswind stability of the vehicles tends to decrease on curved and moving 
track systems (Hosoi and Tanifuji, 2012). 
 
4.2.3. Snow and icing  
Rail switches, crossing and check rail flangeway are likely to be often 
exposed to snow and ice accumulations in winter seasons, thereby reducing 
control of vehicles and increasing the risk of derailments on railway turnouts. 
In addition to this, the surface of stock and running rail, switch blades might 
be coated with ice or frost. This gives rise to weakening the friction force 
between the wheel and rail, and, thus, poses a risk associated with slipping, 
sliding and loss of control on turnouts. On the other hand, harsh winter 
conditions, e.g. icing, could make turnout infrastructures, such as signal 
systems, switch the motor out-of-service. 
 
 
4.2.4. Temperature  
Rail neutral temperature is the operational temperature range at which the 
rail has no longitudinal stress. Any significant deviation below or above rail 
neutral temperature might be one of the most disruptive weather events for 
turnout systems. Extreme high tempera-ture leads to formation of large lateral 
misalignments in stock and running rails, often resulting in derailments. On 
the other hand, ex-treme cold also might bring about derailment, not only 
inducing brittle tracks and separated or broken rail, but freezing moisture 
often pre-sented on the surface of the rail as well. 
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Table 7  
Derailment-related nodes, their description and relevant situation for railway turnouts.  
 
Node Description Relevant situation 
   
R1 Extreme wind Interaction problems, blockage 
R2 Snowfall Slipping, blockage, vision loss 
R3 Fog Vision loss 
R4 Rainfall Slipping, vision loss, track bed problems, geometry 
  problems 
R5 Flood Track bed problems, blockage, mechanical/electrical 
  based errors 
R6 High temperature Geometry problems 
R7 Low temperature Embrittlement 
   
 
4.2.5. Slides of mud and rocks  
The safety and eﬃciency of turnout operations can be threatened by slides 
of weather-caused hazards such as snow, mud and rocks. These hazards 
induce derailment risk when the ground under or around a turnout moves as a 
result of freeze-thaw cycles, heavy rains or high wind. 
 
 
4.2.6. Dense fog  
Where the railway signalling systems are used at turnouts, drivers are 
advised of the status of the section of track ahead. As dense fog is highly 
likely to reduce visibility, whereby not only might drivers not properly detect 
such systems, but they also may not even notice turn-outs in time to stop or 
slow down. This may cause the train to be de-railed, and prevent keeping 
passengers and goods safe. 
 
4.3. Categorisation 
 
In the light of the many causes and risk factors discussed in the previous 
section, the situations leading to derailment on turnouts have been categorised 
in Table 7. The nodes 1–5 have been addressed to extreme conditions. For 
instance, the node R1 stands for the occurrence of extreme wind, including 
high wind and tornadoes, while snowfall, resulting in icing on track, or 
blocking movable parts of turnouts, or vision loss due to high density in the 
precipitation, is assigned as R2.  
On the other hand, nodes 6 and 7 refer to two variations of tem-perature 
phenomena as, firstly, temperature entails two extreme var-iations, unlike the 
others in the table, and, secondly, it is noticed, when investigating the data on 
weather-related turnout failures, that there has been considerable number of 
derailments occurred at turnouts on high/low temperatures days. 
 
 
5. Bayesian Network model and probability assessment 
 
5.1. FBN-based probability assessment frame 
 
There is a long record of weather-caused derailments at turnouts, which 
has enhanced the knowledge of what causes most give rise to derailment. 
However, we have no idea regarding the interaction of these causes or about 
what the probability distribution is going to be like in a situation in which one 
of these causes is impossible to happen, e.g. tornado in areas with mild 
climate. Hence, there is a need for a generic BN-based weather-caused flow 
diagram to be developed.  
For the implementation of weather-related derailment estimates at 
turnouts, a systematic Bayesian Network is developed, as seen in Fig. 2. In 
this proposed approach, the following three steps are adopted: 
 
• Step (1) Problem definition: Carry out a search of available data-bases 
which refer to all kinds of weather-related derailments; judge data in order 
to identify all anticipated weather-based causes/fac-tors to potential 
derailment accidents at turnouts; pay attention to causal relationships 
among those causes/factors. Step 1 is revealed in detail in Section 4. 
Safety Science xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx 
 
• Step (2) BN module construction: Define both variables (nodes) having a 
finite set of mutually exclusive states as identified root nodes (RNs) or 
intermediate nodes (INs) to represent the identified hazards; develop 
failure logic through conditional probability dis-tribution (CPD); establish 
a network topology to describe condi-tional independence relationships of 
defined variables. Step 2 is archived in the following sub-headings in this 
section.  
• Step (3) Probability estimates and decision: Specify states and assign input 
values for probability estimation of RNs; calculate prob-abilities based 
upon Buckley’s alpha cut methods via Eq. (7); update the values of all 
nodes by calculating posterior probabilities; per-form sensitivity analysis 
to reveal the performance of each variable’s contribution to the occurrence 
of a derailment accidents at turnouts. Step 3 is discussed in Section 6. 
 
 
5.2. The Bayesian Network structure of weather-related derailments 
 
The failure-consequence scenarios from the top to bottom nodes using a 
directed acyclic graph (DAG) are created through the logic diagram in 
accordance with the accidents reports. Thus, a weather-re-lated derailment 
Bayesian Network (WRDBN) is established through steps 1 and 2 in Fig. 2. 
WRDBN, as seen in Fig. 3, is formed of 11 root nodes, which are addressed 
to intermediate nodes, contributing to the leaf node, derailment. Intermediate 
nodes have been described as re-levant stations in Table 7. Root nodes, 
intermediate nodes and the leaf node are encoloured into grey, orange and red 
in Fig. 3, respectively.  
The descriptions of all nodes illustrated in Fig. 3 are given in Table 8. The 
intermediate nodes are added in accordance with primary causes in the 
accident records. For instance, high wind (R1) is shown as a root cause giving 
rise to inadequacies in railway turnout management system that allow the 
immediate causes (I1, I2) to arise unchecked, leading to the accidents. The 
intermediate nodes and their relations to root causes are revealed as result of 
investigation of over 17,000 acci-dent reports between 2006 and 2015. 
Intermediate nodes firstly aim at identifying what kinds of areas are impacted 
by weather patterns at turnouts, and, secondly, to investigate to what degree 
the patterns ef-fect on the intermediate nodes in comparison with the other 
cases with non-environmental reasons. 
 
As an example, obstructions, I2, is determined to be one of the most 
common causes encountered at railway turnouts, and to be formed by not only 
frozen precipitation (R2), including snowfall, hail, etc., but also wind (R1), 
often blowing debris and trees from the trackside and from neighbouring land 
onto turnouts. To calculate conditional probabilities, the other cases, such as 
maintenance errors, vandalism, etc., as well as these two causes-related cases, 
are considered. In other words, even if either R1 or R2 does not present, 
derailment as the result of any ob-struction is likely to happen. Therefore, 
each accident report has been examined in detail to find absolute answers 
regarding the relation be-tween derailment and environmental eﬀ ects, and to 
what degree these environmental eﬀ ects take place in derailments at railway 
turnout systems. 
 
 
6. Results 
 
6.1. Marginal and conditional probability assessment 
 
In contrast to utilising the subjective data by means of a review/ 
interview-based dataset, this research only relies on absolute data of 
derailment cases collected in the United States for the period between 2005 
and 2015. Marginal probabilities of the weather-based events are calculated, 
considering all accident cases occurring at railway turnout systems. Thus, a 
marginal probability of an event presents an idea of how likelihood a 
derailment happens in comparison to the other weather-based events. Table 9 
shows lower and upper marginal prob-abilities of three events, including R1, 
R2 and R5. The table is prepared in accordance with the recommended 
instructions in Section 2, while 
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Fig. 2. The frame of Bayes Network-based derailment prediction for railway turnouts. 
 
values against each alpha-cut are calculated by Eq. (7), and then ta-bulated 
through Eq. (8). These calculations are executed by MATLAB ver.2016b. 
 
As seen in Table 9, marginal probabilities in the network are binary 
∼ ∼ 
(R1 = r12 )(α ), respec- with true and false values e.g. P (R1 = r11 )(α), P 
tively. In order to make sure and present the behaviours of lower and upper 
probabilities, α-cuts are aligned with intervals of 0.2.  
Aside from marginal probability calculations, seven intermediate nodes 
and one leaf node are revealed to identify to what degree the notion of degree 
of belief in their occurrence was conditional on a body of knowledge in 
WRDBN. The calculation of all conditional prob-abilities is executed through 
Eq. (2) in compliance with the Bayes rules given in Section 2. Eqs. (7) and (8) 
are utilised to calculate and tabulate the probabilities. 
 
I1 and I4 out of those nodes are presented in Table 10. According to the 
nature of conditional probabilities, it is attempted to find all var-iations of the 
events. For instance, I1 responds to aerodynamic pro-blems and is composed 
of a root node (R1) (see Section 5.2). Ad-ditionally, a derailment is likely to 
take place, regardless of this rood node, through tornadoes (see Section 4.2). 
Therefore, the probability of an event’s occurrence given that another event 
has already happened or not happened is revealed through accident reports.  
 
Table 8  
Variables in WRDBN.  
 
Nodes Node kind Description 
   
R
1 Root Extreme wind 
R
2 Root Frozen precipitation 
R3 Root Fog 
R4 Root Liquid precipitation 
R5 Root Flood 
R6 Root High temperature 
R
7 Root Low temperature 
I1 Intermediate Aerodynamic problems 
I2 Intermediate Obstructions 
I3 Intermediate Slipping 
I4 Intermediate Vision loss 
I5 Intermediate Track bed problem 
I6 Intermediate Geometry problem 
I7 Intermediate Component failures 
Dt Leaf Derailment 
   
 
6.2. Prior and posterior probabilities for WRDBN 
 
Prior probabilities of nodes in WRDBN are the original probabilities of an 
outcome, which is only related to environmental-based, i.e. weather, 
derailments at railway turnout systems, and will be updated with new 
information to create posterior probabilities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Established BN model for WRDBN. 
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Table 9  
Marginal probabilities for ‘extreme wind’, ‘frozen precipitation’ and ‘flood’ causing de-railment 
at turnouts.  
 ∼    ∼    
  P (R1 = r11 )(α)    P (R1 = r12 )(α )   
Alpha-cuts  p
L 
(∝) p
U 
(∝)  pL (∝) pU (∝) 
  r11  r11   r12  r12  
0.00 0.24709 0.27077 0.72923 0.75291 
0.20 0.25304 0.26482 0.73518 0.74696 
0.40 0.25506 0.26280 0.73720 0.74494 
0.60 0.25652 0.26134 0.73866 0.74348 
0.80 0.25776 0.26009 0.73991 0.74224 
1.00 0.25893 0.25893 0.74107 0.74107 
 ∼    ∼    
  P (R2 = r21)(α )  
(∝) 
 P (R2 = r2 2 )(α)  
(∝) Alpha-Cuts  p
L 
(∝) p
U 
 p
L 
(∝) p
U 
  r21  r21   r22  r22  
0.00 0.46864 0.49565 0.50435 0.53136 
0.20 0.47542 0.48886 0.51114 0.52458 
0.40 0.47773 0.48655 0.51345 0.52227 
0.60 0.47939 0.48489 0.51511 0.52061 
0.80 0.48081 0.48347 0.51653 0.51919 
1.00 0.48214 0.48214 0.51786 0.51786 
 ∼    ∼    
  P (R5 = r51)(α )  
(∝) 
 P (R5 = r5 2 )(α)  
(∝) Alpha-Cuts  p
L 
(∝) p
U 
 pL (∝) pU 
  r51  r51   r52  r52  
0.00 0.07301 0.08770 0.91230 0.92699 
0.20 0.07670 0.08401 0.91599 0.92330 
0.40 0.07796 0.08276 0.91724 0.92204 
0.60 0.07886 0.08185 0.91815 0.92114 
0.80 0.07963 0.08108 0.91892 0.92037 
1.00 0.08036 0.08036 0.91964 0.91964 
            
 
To identify whether the unequal proportions across nodes present a real 
diﬀ erence in the true population or whether the diﬀ erence is a result of 
sampling error, prior probabilities that greatly aﬀ ect the ac-curacy of results 
in WRDBN are specified and illustrated in Fig. 4. Red bars show the prior-
based likelihood of occurrence of a derailment in the nodes, while ∝- cuts 
equals to ‘1.00’. I2, obstructions, seems to be an intermediate node, causing 
mostly a weather-related derailment at railway turnout systems, followed by 
I3, slipping, and I5, trackbed problems. On the other hand, I4, vision loss, and 
I7, component fail-ures, are the rarest learned events in WRDBN. 
 
It is seen also from Fig. 4 that most of the weather-based causes have 
often resulted in derailments at turnouts. However, almost one-sixth of 
derailments happened as a result of those, since other causes except weather-
based ones could give rise to derailments as well. A posterior 
 
Table 10 
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probability is the probability of assigning observations to groups given the 
data, and is one of the underlined steps in the Bayes Network frame, as shown 
in Section 5. It might be significant to understand how the prior probabilities 
change when a new observation is added into the BN for leaf node. It is 
supposed that Dt∼,derailment at turnouts, is observed to take place, which is 
notated as P (Dt = 1)(α1.00).  
Fig. 5 illustrates how the alpha cuts responding to posterior prob- 
abilities  nodes  are  distributed through  all  intermediate  nodes. 
∼ (I
 
2
 
=
 
I
 
2
1 
|D
 
=
 
1)(α
[0,1.00] U [1.00,0] 
) 
is calculated to be the most common P 
weather failure types, ranging from 0.48059 to 0.70574, and followed by I3 
and I5. It is also found that each probability with diﬀ erent α- cut values 
entails diﬀ erent intervals. Considering such rare an occurrence of events, this 
distribution provides probability information with a wide perspective to 
railway operators. Therefore, the most likely value of 
∼ 
probability numbers P (I 2 = I 21 |D = 1)(∝ ) is 0.59304, whilst the most 
∼ 
likely value of probability number P (I 1 = I 11 |D = 1)(∝) is 0.01151. 
This also shows that the posterior probability changes significantly as a result 
of the existence of non-categorised weather-related accidents (see Sections 
4.1 and 4.3). That is, there might be two explanations for this pattern: the 
impact of a limited number of codes for environmental-related accidents in 
the FRA database, and the sensitivity of the node I2 and its roots to node D. 
 
 
Fig.   6 shows four   prior probabilities, 
∼  
∼ 
P (R1 = r 11 )(α), 
 ∼ ∼ 
(I 5 = i51)(α ), and posterior prob- P (R1 = r 21)(α), P (I 2 = i 21)(α ), P 
  ∼   ∼  ∼ 
abilities, P (R1 =∼r 11 |D = 1)(∝),  P (R 2 = R 21 |D = 1)(∝), P 
(I 2 = I 21 |D = 1)(∝), P (I 5 = I 51 |D = 1)(∝) in WRDBN. The prior prob-ability 
distribution is coloured in magenta, while the posterior prob-abilities are shown as 
blue lines in the figure. As marginal probabilities are prior probabilities in BNs, the 
distribution is matched with Table 9, given in Section 6.1. These nodes are found 
to be the most changing ones, given D equals to 1. The peak of lines occurs when 
α−cut is 1.00, which gives rise to 0 confidence interval. On the other hand, the 
higher the values of confidence intervals get, the less α-cuts are valued. This 
provides an opportunity to railway operators, when the uncertainty of any event in 
WRDBN is high, and the small values of α-cuts are taken. This is because 
probability intervals get larger and, as result, informa-tion loss is prevented. In 
contrast, when a database gives concrete in-formation on an event history, it will be 
better to opt for the high values of α-cuts, which makes probability intervals 
narrower and, so, results in a more realistic response to investigation. 
 
 
 
6.3. Sensitivity analysis 
 
In this study, a preliminary conclusion (i.e. node ‘derailment at 
 
Conditional probabilities for ‘Aerodynamic Problems’ and ‘Vision loss’ causing derailment at turnouts.  
 ∼  
|R1)(α ) 
     ∼  
|R1)(α ) 
      
  P (I 1 = I 11       P (I 1 = I 12       
Alpha-Cuts  p
L 
(∝) p
U 
(∝) p
L 
(∝) p
U 
(∝) p
L 
(∝) p
U 
(∝) p
L 
(∝) p
U 
(∝)  
  I 11,R11  I 11,R11  I 11,R12  I 11,R12   I 12,R11  I 12,R11  I 12,R12  I 12,R12   
0.00 0.40048 0.4271 0.00646 0.01156 0.5729 0.59952 0.98844 0.99354  
0.20 0.40717 0.42041 0.00774 0.01028 0.57959 0.59283 0.98972 0.99226  
0.40 0.40945 0.41814 0.00817 0.00984 0.58186 0.59055 0.99016 0.99183  
0.60 0.41108 0.4165 0.00849 0.00953 0.5835 0.58892 0.99047 0.99151  
0.80 0.41248 0.4151 0.00876 0.00926 0.5849 0.58752 0.99074 0.99124  
1.00 0.41379 0.41379 0.00901 0.00901 0.58621 0.58621 0.99099 0.99099  
 ∼        ∼         
  P (I 4 = I 4 1|R 4)(α ) 
(∝) 
 
(∝) 
 
(∝) 
 P (I 4 = I 4 2 |R 4)(α ) 
(∝) 
 
(∝) 
 
(∝) Alpha-Cuts  p
L 
(∝) p
U 
p
L 
p
U 
p
L 
(∝) p
U 
pL pU 
  I 41,R 41  I 41,R 41  I 41,R 42  I 41,R 42   I 42,R 41  I 42,R 41  I 42,R 42  I 42,R 42   
0.00 0.48649 0.51351 0.00646 0.01156 0.48649 0.51351 0.98844 0.99354  
0.20 0.49328 0.50672 0.00774 0.01028 0.49328 0.50672 0.98972 0.99226  
0.40 0.49559 0.50441 0.00818 0.00984 0.49559 0.50441 0.99016 0.99182  
0.60 0.49725 0.50275 0.00849 0.00953 0.49725 0.50275 0.99047 0.99151  
0.80 0.49867 0.50133 0.00876 0.00926 0.49867 0.50133 0.99074 0.99124  
1.00 0.50000 0.50000 0.00901 0.00901 0.50000 0.50000 0.99099 0.99099  
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Fig. 4. The distribution of P Prior (∝) of r the root, intermediate and leaf node in WRDBN towards ∝-cuts = 1. 
 
Fig. 5. The distribution of P posterior (∝) of the in-
termediate nodes and the leaf node in WRDBN to-wards 
∝-cuts.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
turnouts due to the reasons in Table 6’ is considerably sensitive to node 
‘frozen precipitation’) is drawn based on posterior probabilities, e.g. 
∼ 
P (R 2 = R 21 |D = 1)(∝). Therefore, the sensitivity analysis is performed, 
inputting the diﬀ erent rational parameters values in order to monitor the impact of 
these changes on the posterior probabilities through a number of membership 
functions, μ∼R2(x). 
∼ 
In WRDBN, the marginal probability of this node, P (R2 = r21)(α), has 
been found as 0.48214. As a result, the range is kept as large as possible in 
order to give an idea as to how sensitive the model’s 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
performance is to a large range of changes in the input parameters. To reach 
the results of nine diﬀ erent values, an in-house developed MATLAB program 
has been implemented into the FBN inference.  
Fig. 7 illustrates these results, showing the confidence-based prob-ability 
distribution of R2 towards the various variations of node R2 from 0.1 to 0.9. 
As seen in the figure, each peaking curve indicates that 
∼ 
(R 2 = r 21 |D = 1)(α) clearly changes with 
∼ 
(R2 = r21)(α). It is also P P 
shown that there is a positively increasing trend in the posterior 
∼ 
probabilities of node R2 when P (R2 = r21)(α) steadily increases. Thus, 
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Fig. 6. Prior fuzzy probabilities and posterior fuzzy probability of R1, R2, I2 and I5 in WRDBN. 
 
the figure presents a reason to believe that the above conclusion is reliable. 
 
On the other hand, results match, in a sense, with the previous statement 
the ‘higher the values of confidence intervals get, the less α-cuts are valued’. 
As node R2 is inputted with higher values, the confidence intervals impact 
much higher on probability distribution towards alpha-cuts, which stresses 
how uncertain the node is. 
 
7. Discussion 
 
FBN is a quite prominent technology with huge potential for various 
applications across many engineering domains. This study discusses FBN and 
its application in railway turnout systems. The proposed FBN approach, 
namely WRDBN, uses the probabilities of environmental-re-lated causes of 
accidents to perform Bayesian inference, which is es-tablished by causal 
relationship through accident reports. Therefore, the BN provides the model 
structure of WRDBN, fuzzy prior probability and likelihood calculation, and 
inference and interpretation. Aside from BN, there have been many other 
techniques which are suggested to risk, occurrence or consequence analysis of 
any type of accident across railway systems. Fuzzy fault tree analysis (FFTA) 
currently seems to be one of the common methods for turnout, along with the 
other railway engineering systems (Jafarian and Razvani, 2012; Peng et al., 
2016; Huang et al., 2000; Ishak et al., 2016). One of the main diﬀ erences 
 
between those FFTAs and this proposed FBN is that FBN might be better able 
to handle the causal relations in a complex environment, including many 
engineering works, e.g. trackbed, aerodynamic, adhesion, be-cause FFTAs are 
mainly comprised of simple Boolean functions such as AND-gate and OR-
gate while FBN is based on diﬀ erent causal re-lationships, in particular 
considering its conditional probability calcu-lation. 
 
Derailments at railway turnouts yield quite serious consequences, 
including loss of life, operational shutdown and damage to railway assets. 
Although these derailments account for one-third of all derail-ments on lines, 
those that are weather-related are quite rare events. As a result, the research 
only focuses on weather-related accidents to un-derstand what types of causes 
are dominant in a particular scenario. Frozen precipitation is observed to be 
considerably responsible for such accidents, which gives rise mainly to 
preventing proper movement of switch blade. From the perspective of 
sensitivity analysis, the structure of the proposed WRDBN is observed to 
produce a reliable measure of performance of this node. The probabilities are 
extracted and calculated by means of oﬃcial accident reports over the years 
between 2006 and 2015 across the US. WRDBN only gives an idea on the 
risk elements associated with weather and which lead to derailments at 
various types of railway turnout derailments. Due to the United States’ 9.9 
million km2 area and mid-continental placement, the country has a widely 
varying climate, which is unique to understand the impact of diﬀ erent 
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 ∼ ∼ 
(R 2 = r 21 |D = 1)(α ). Fig. 7. Sensitivity analysis for μ
∼
R2(x ) of P (R 2 = r 21)(α ) in WRDBN, corresponding to P  
climate patterns on railway turnouts. However, as climate varies on the basis 
of its prevailing geography, it should be expected that the weather 
characteristics of diﬀ erent countries lead to diﬀ erent marginal and 
conditional probabilities of the nodes although the structure of BN is 
established in the same way, as presented in Fig. 2. 
 
8. Conclusion 
 
In engineering operations, BN is considered to be one of the eﬀ ec-tive 
tools of uncertain knowledge representation. This research reveals to what 
degree a weather pattern impacts on derailments on railway turnout systems, 
and what kind of causes lead to it. It is proposed to use Buckley’s probability 
calculation on the basis of confidence intervals to obtain marginal and 
conditional probabilities, and to reach prior and posterior conditional 
probabilities in the recommended WRDBN. Although data are obtained after 
the investigation of some 18,000 US-based reports, it is identified that this 
kind of derailment is a quite rare event. In contrast to conventional BN 
approaches, this confidence in-terval approach is seen likely to provide the 
flexibility to make deci-sions on the probabilities of failures resulting in 
derailments. In other words, it provides how to obtain probabilities in 
WRDBN as intervals instead of crisp values. Probability intervals using data 
are found through a theoretical basis of confidence intervals and probability. 
 
It is determined that there are seven root causes, R1 to 7, and seven 
intermediate nodes, I1 to 7, which are aﬀ ected by weather patterns and drive 
derailment at turnouts. A few of those nodes, such as frozen precipitation, 
liquid precipitation and high wind, seem to draw the attention. The confidence 
probability intervals of these nodes are ob-served to be larger than the other 
nodes, as the eﬀ ect of changing the prior/posterior probability of the leaf 
node (derailment) is considerably high. In summary, the paper proposes an 
alpha cut-based FBN model ensuring that its application is conducted in a 
well-managed, dis-ciplined and consistent manner that promotes the delivery 
of risk as-sessment results for railway turnouts. 
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